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Abstract
This paper oﬀers a direct industry-of-origin benchmark for the United States and the
United Kingdom around 1910. The industry-of-origin approach allows for a disaggre-
gation of international productivity diﬀerentials at the industry level, which enhances
a deeper understanding of the comparative economic performance of these two coun-
tries. The benchmark sheds new light on the recent debate between Broadberry andWard
and Devereux regarding the Anglo-American income and productivity diﬀerentials in the
nineteenth and early twentieth century. I find that, on the eve of the First World War, the
gap between the US and the UK was greater than suggested by most previous studies in
terms of GDP per worker and GDP per capita. This revision arises mainly from a con-
siderably higher estimate of the comparative productivity in the American agricultural
and mining sectors. On the basis of time-series evidence, I find that the UK ceded pro-
ductivity and income leadership earlier than conventional estimates have shown. I date
the US take-over in GDP per capita around the 1880s and not post-1900 as suggested by
Broadberry and Maddison.
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1 Introduction
From the 1940s onwards such notable economists as Kuznets (1966) and Mitchell (2007) in
the US and Clark (1951) in the UK have been active in the field of comparative economic
performance of nations. At present the best known comparisons of long-run productivity
performance come from the seminal work of Maddison (1982, 1991, 1995, 2001). Part of the
appeal of his approach is the wide temporal and spatial coverage of his data, the transparent
methodology and his sole reliance on national time-series published by statistical oﬃces,
which makes it exceptionally well suited for research on comparative economic growth.
The Maddison time-series, or any of the long-term studies on economic growth for that
matter, suﬀer from at least one major drawback: time-series projections do not adequately
account for shifts in sectoral output and changes in product prices. This becomes particularly
apparent when time-series of diﬀerent origins are projected from a certain benchmark-year
into distant periods. In recent years, economic historians have stressed the need for new,
more detailed, comparisons of welfare and productivity for earlier periods, particularly for
the pre-World War I era (Prados de la Escosura 2000; van Zanden 2003; Fukao, Ma, and Yuan
2007).
As the debate between Broadberry (2003) versus Ward and Devereux (2003, 2004) in the
Journal of Economic History has emphasized, direct benchmark comparisons between coun-
tries are a much wanted alternative for the long-span projections. In this discussion, Ward
and Devereux challenge the conventional picture of relative income levels and the timing of
the American take-over in particular. The consensus view of US/UK relative income is based
almost exclusively on the work of Maddison (2001). Maddison’s extrapolations shows that
income levels in the United Kingdom exceeded that of the United States by approximately
one-third in 1870. As illustrated in the second column of table 1, Maddison’s time-series
evidence reveals that, from 1870 onwards, the Anglo-American income gap declined until,
sometime around the turn of the century, the US definitively took over the lead. These pro-
jections all hinge on an income benchmark for the year 1990, which Maddison extrapolates
backwards to the late nineteenth century, relying on a collection of well over 100 years worth
of national accounts to bridge the gap. Economists have cast severe doubts, however, whether
these long-span projections are actually viable and produce credible results in the face of two
WorldWars, several major depressions, and the host of new products and services introduced
over the course of the twentieth century.1
Ward and Devereux (2003, 840) provide an alternative measure of the US/UK income rel-
atives based on direct Purchasing-Power-Parity (PPP) adjusted benchmarks of expenditure.
For the period between 1872 to 1930,Ward andDevereux constructed seven Anglo-American
expenditure benchmarks, which they supplemented with existing benchmarks from Gilbert
and Kravis and the work done under the auspices of the International Comparison Project
1. See Prados de la Escosura (2000) for a discussion.
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Table 1: Comparative GDP per capita, US and UK
(UK=100, 1872–1990)
Ward & Ward &
year Devereux Maddison year Devereux Maddison
1872 118 78 1955 217 143
1874 118 79 1967 175 147
1878 127 84 1970 167 143
1884 130 87 1973 169 143
1891 122 90 1975 156 141
1905 122 105 1980 154 147
1930 133 118 1985 167 152
1950 208 143 1990 145 145
Sources:Ward and Devereux (2003, 840) and Maddison (2008,
accessed on 11 March 2011).
(Gilbert and Kravis 1954; Gilbert 1958; Maddison 1995). In all they provide sixteen ‘snap-
shots’ which renders a complete overview of relative US/UK performance over the course of
the long twentieth century (see table 1). From this Ward and Devereux (2003, 826) conclude
that – contrary to the estimates by Maddison – the US, not the UK, led in terms of income per
capita in the 1870s; “the UK kept pace with the US throughout the late Victorian era, while
most of the British relative decline occurred between 1905 and 1950.”
The findings by Ward and Devereux met with harsh criticism from Broadberry (2003,
852), who disputed their direct benchmarks on account of the implied revision of the rela-
tive US/UK price levels as well as their handling of the historical national accounts. Mostly
though, Broadberry deplored the fact that no attempt was made toward a reconciliation of
the long-span time-series projections and the direct benchmarks. He states that, “a satisfac-
tory account of the evolution of relative per capita incomes over a long period should be
able to encompass both sorts of evidence.” As a check against the time-series extrapolations,
Broadberry proposes a set of sectoral productivity benchmarks, for which he suggests basing
the benchmark estimate of relative Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on output as opposed to
the expenditure approach taken by Ward and Devereux.
To this aim, Broadberry and Irwin (2006) presented a comprehensive Anglo-American
industry-of-origin benchmark for the year 1910. This industry-of-origin benchmark – based
primarily on earlier work by Broadberry (1994a, 1997a, 1997b, 1998) – provides a full break-
down of the relative productivity and income diﬀerentials between the US and the UK at the
sectoral level. Broadberry and Irwin conclude that their benchmark estimate of both GDP
per capita and per worker move closely in line with the time-series projections. They trace
the source of the initial British lead in GDP per capita to a slightly higher level of labor pro-
ductivity in the UK coupled with a substantially higher share of the British population in the
labor force. The latter greatly boosted overall British output per capita.
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In their sectoral decomposition of labor productivity, Broadberry and Irwin (2006, 262)
show that “the United States had roughly equal labor productivity in agriculture, much
higher productivity in industry, and a rapid catch-up in service sector productivity.” The
UK, already by 1870, engaged a large share of its labor force in industry and services, while
US labor was still primarily engaged in the low-productive agricultural sector. The initial
British aggregate labor-productivity lead was thus the result of compositional eﬀects rather
than superior productivity at the sectoral level. On the basis of this evidence, Broadberry
(1997a, 1998) claims that the US take-over, both in terms of overall productivity and per
capita income, was the result of a structural shift away from agriculture together with rapid
relative productivity increases in the American service sector. The close correspondence be-
tween the evidence presented by Broadberry and Irwin and the Maddison projections, led
the former to suggest that the conventional view is indeed correct. Consequently, they reject
the claim by Ward and Devereux, as well as Prados de la Escosura (2000), that index number
problems introduce a considerable bias in the long-span Anglo-American projections.
Recent literature emphasizes, however, that comparative productivity in manufacturing
was more dynamic than asserted by Broadberry and that technological developments in this
sector played a substantial role in explaining the productivity gap between the US and UK
for the inter-war era (Field 2006; de Jong and Woltjer 2011). In addition, it appears unlikely
that the American agricultural sector was left entirely unaﬀected by the rapid developments
in industry during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Given the strong increase
in demand for agricultural goods (in particular from the textile and food and drink indus-
tries), rising wages accompanying the labor productivity gains in industry, as well as access
to cheap fertilizers, energy, farm machinery, and the abundance of land, one would expect
the American agricultural sector to develop in line with the industrial sector. As noted by
Habakkuk (1962, 34–7), “scarcity of labor ensured that, within the limits set by geology and
climate, American agriculture developed along land-intensive, labor saving lines, that is, as-
sumed high labor-productivity forms.” Studies of the American and British mining sectors
also appear to suggest a greater US lead in productivity terms than suggested by Broadberry
and Irwin. American miners were keen to take full advantage of the major improvements in
labor-saving technologies – such as mechanized coal-cutting and electric lighting – whereas
the Britishmine-owners generally displayed a conservative attitude toward these innovations
(Taylor 1961, 59; Walters 1975, 296). Unfavorable geological conditions and a dwindling sup-
ply of natural resources in the UK explain this hesitant attitude and point at a much greater
productivity potential in the US (McCloskey 1971, 293).
In this paper I revisit the Anglo-American benchmark around the year 1910. Similar to
Broadberry and Irwin I opt for the industry-of-origin approach, as I agree with these authors
that it is doubtful whether direct estimates of relative income and productivity between the
US and UK should be based solely on expenditure benchmarks. The expenditure approach,
as implemented by Ward and Devereux, establishes a direct link between comparative in-
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come levels and consumption possibilities, making those estimates particularly well suited
for international comparisons of income and living standards. However, for the international
comparisons of productivity and economic performance in general, a direct comparison of
output at the industry level is preferable (van Ark 1993). Whereas expenditure PPPs are
influenced by imports, trade margins and transport costs, industry-of-origin conversion fac-
tors are based on ex-factory prices, excluding these elements. Industry-of-origin PPPs thus
produce a more refined comparison of labor productivity levels. More importantly, however,
the expenditure approach does not allow for a breakdown of labor productivity at a sec-
toral level. The industry-of-origin approach provides a more in-depth view of the sources of
growth and the eﬀects of structural change. As I will illustrate in this paper, these relative
sectoral productivity diﬀerences and structural eﬀects are key to understanding the Anglo-
American comparative economic performance in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury. I focus my eﬀorts on agricultural, mining and manufacturing, the sectors in which the
US had the greatest productivity potential, but provide a comparative productivity for the
total economy as well.
I find that, on the eve of the First World War, the gap between the US and the UK was
larger than suggested by most previous studies in terms of relative income per head of the
population. Compositional eﬀects in general and a high level of productivity in American
agriculture and mining in particular are instrumental in explaining these revised income
per capita estimates. The UK appears to have ceded productivity leadership earlier than con-
ventional estimates have shown. I date the US take-over around the 1880s and not post-1900,
as suggested by Broadberry and Maddison.
Section 2 provides an extensive discussion of the methods behind the benchmark com-
parison and presents an overview of the data sources used. My main results, the sectoral
purchasing power parities and productivity levels, are presented in sections 3 and 4. I will
discuss the implications for both the total-economy estimates as well as the time-series pro-
jections in section 5. In the last section I conclude.
2 Methodology and data
For the construction of my early twentieth century benchmark I opt for the industry-of-origin
approach. My choice of industry-of-origin methodology does diﬀer from the method applied
by Broadberry and Irwin, however. The latter establish their sectoral productivity measures
on the basis of a comparison of physical quantities of output, relying on a methodology first
proposed by Rostas (1948). The benefit of the quantity approach is that it is generally less
demanding in terms of data requirements, which has made it the method of choice for direct
benchmarks for the period prior to the Second World War. Data availability for the post-
war period has allowed a more sophisticated methodology though, based on the calculation
of real value added at the industry level using relative producer prices. Instead of a direct
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comparison of physical quantities, this method measures the value of gross and net output
by industry (in national currency) which is then translated into a common currency with a
sector-specific purchasing power parity (PPP). This procedure was first applied by Paige and
Bombach (1959) in an Anglo-American comparison for 1950. The methodology behind these
industry-of-origin benchmarks was subsequently further refined and used in a host of in-
ternational benchmark comparisons for the post-war period; most notably the International
Comparison of Output and Productivity (ICOP) project by Maddison and van Ark (1988)
and van Ark (1993). Recently however, the extended ICOP methodology has also been ap-
plied to international comparisons for the period preceding the Second World War (Dormois
2004; Fremdling, de Jong, and Timmer 2007a; de Jong and Woltjer 2011; Frankema, Woltjer,
and Smits 2013). These historical industry-of-origin studies not only prove that it is feasible
to apply modern techniques for earlier periods, but they also stress the advantages of these
methods over the earlier quantity based benchmark comparisons.
Although the basic concepts behind the available industry-of-origin benchmark tech-
niques are similar, there are some marked diﬀerences between the ICOP and the earlier
quantity approach. In this section I will only discuss the basic methodology behind the ICOP
approach, but appendix A provides an in-depth discussion of the methodological diﬀerences
between both approaches. In this appendix I show that the quantity approach can be easily
rewritten to approximate a basic version of the ICOP approach. I will also show, however,
that in practice the outcomes of these methods can deviate substantially. Particularly the
necessity, within the quantity approach, to assign labor to individual commodities instead
of industries limits this method’s ability to estimate productivity for industries producing
a wide array of heterogeneous products. In addition, as I will illustrate below, the ICOP
framework allows for diﬀerences in the relative prices of both outputs and inputs and takes
diﬀerences between countries in their share of intermediate inputs in the value of gross out-
put into account. I demonstrate the basic ICOP methodology on the basis of a simple single
industry, two country, k product framework.
The ICOP approach
In the ICOP approach, the first step in the calculation of comparative labor productivity is
the matching of products into unit values (p). The unit value, p
ij
, which represents the local
average price of commodity i in country j, can be obtained by dividing the output value (v
ij
)
by the respective quantity (q
ij
) for this product; as shown in equation (1) below. In a bilateral
comparison, broadly defined products with similar characteristics are matched – e.g. iron
ore, refined sugar, cement or bicycles – and the ratio of the unit values in both countries is
taken; see equation (2).2 These unit value ratios (uvr) thus reflect the product specific relative
2. A complete list of the unit value ratios, on which the industry-specific PPPs presented in this paper are
based, is provided in appendix B.
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prices expressed in terms of country n’s currency per unit of the base country o’s currency.
p
ij
=
v
ij
q
ij
(1)
uvr
io
=
p
in
p
io
(2)
The uvrs can then be aggregated to the industry level. For an industry which holds k
matched products, the respective uvrs are weighted according to their share in total matched
output (v
i
=
P
v
i
). The resulting aggregated output uvrs are generally referred to as purchasing
power parities (PPP). In a bilateral comparisons the weights of either the base country (o)
or the numerator country (n) can be used, which provide a Laspeyres and a Paasche type
PPP respectively (Fremdling, de Jong, and Timmer 2007a, 14).3 The Laspeyres gross output
purchasing power parity, L
go
, is then given by
L
go
=
P
v
io
 pinp
ioP
v
io
=
P
v
io
uvr
ioP
v
io
(3)
whereas the Paasche gross output purchasing power parity, P
go
, is given by
P
go
=
P
v
inP
v
in
 piop
in
=
P
v
inP
v
in
=uvr
io
(4)
Throughout this paper, I will use the geometric mean of the Laspeyres and Paasche price
indices, the Fisher price index, as the currency conversion factor for my productivity com-
parisons; see equation (5). The Fisher PPPs, as well as the Paasche and Laspeyres PPPs, are
still expressed in terms of country n’s currency per unit of the base country o’s currency, in
line with the uvrs on which they are based.
F
go
=
p
Lgo  P go (5)
As illustrated by Paige and Bombach (1959, 82), suitable conversion factors can be ob-
tained from output price data alone (single deflation) or from price data for both outputs
as well as intermediate inputs (double deflation). Double deflation is generally considered
to be the preferred approach for sector comparisons of output and productivity. A number
of recent studies have shown that the adjustment for diﬀerences in the prices of intermedi-
ate inputs is particularly important for benchmark studies for the early twentieth century
(Fremdling, de Jong, and Timmer 2007a; de Jong and Woltjer 2011).
3. Note that as v is equal to p q, the Laspeyres gross output PPP Lgo can also be expressed as
P
pnqoP
po qo , while the
Paasche gross output PPP, P
go
, is identical to
P
pnqnP
po qn .
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Unfortunately, direct quantity and price information for inputs is not widely available
in the early twentieth century British production statistics. For the construction of the inter-
mediate input PPPs, I thus relied on implicit input-output relations instead. By definition
inputs for one industry are made up of the output of other sectors and industries. The input
PPP for an industry can thus be derived as a weighted set of output PPPs from the industries
furnishing its inputs. For example, around 1900 the British food and drink industry obtained
well over 60 percent of its inputs from the agricultural sector, while most of the remaining
inputs originated from within the food and drink industry itself.4 A weighted average of the
output PPPs for the food and drink industry and the agricultural sector will thus provide a
good proxy of the intermediate input PPP for the food and drink industry.
I relied on the Anglo-American Laspeyres and Paasche output PPPs, previously intro-
duced, as the basis for my intermediate input PPPs. These were subsequently weighted on
the basis of information on the flow of goods between sectors and industries from input-
output tables. Note that this procedure does not take diﬀerences in the cost of transport or
trade margins into account, which I implicitly assume to be similar for both countries (rela-
tive to total costs). Even if the trade and transport margins for both countries diﬀer, however,
the diﬀerences in these costs are unlikely to be so large as to have a substantial eﬀect on the
resulting input PPPs.
The equation for the derivation of the PPPs for intermediate inputs is similar to the cal-
culation of the output PPPs in equations (3)-(5). The Laspeyres input PPP is given by
L
ii
=
P
w
io
Lgo
iP
w
io
(6)
and the Paasche input PPP by
P
ii
=
P
w
inP
w
in
=P go
i
(7)
where w
i
=
P
w
i
represents the share of intermediate inputs supplied by industry i in the total
of inputs consumed by the industry for which the PPP is calculated.
The output and input PPPs in turn allow me to calculate the double deflated value added
PPPs. go
j
and ii
j
denote respectively the value of gross output and intermediate input for a
single industry in country j, at national prices. The Laspeyres value added PPP is given by
L
va
=
go
o
Lgo   ii
o
Lii
go
o
  ii
o
(8)
4. In practice, a substantial proportion of the inputs consumed by an industry will originate from within the
industry itself. This reflects the production of semi-manufactured, or partly finished goods, by separate estab-
lishments within an industry (e.g. flour mills) and the use of these intermediate products by establishments still
part of this industry but further down the production chain (e.g. bakeries).
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while the Paasche value added PPP is given by
P
va
=
go
n
  ii
n
go
n
=P go   ii
n
=P ii
(9)
Again, the Fisher value added PPP is derived as the geometric mean of the Laspeyres and
Paasche price indices
F
va
=
p
Lva  P va (10)
The double deflated value added PPPs can in turn be used to convert either countries’
output per unit of labor to the other countries’ currency; see equation (12). Throughout this
paper I use value added (va) as the measure of output, as in (11). LP thus measures the
industry-specific level of PPP-adjusted value added per worker in country n relative to the
value added per worker in the base country o.
lp
j
=
va
j
emp
j
(11)
LP =
lp
n
=F
va
lp
o
(12)
Sources
The gross output PPPs presented in the next section are based on the oﬃcial agricultural,
mining and manufacturing production censuses of the United Kingdom and the United
States. These surveys contain detailed information on quantities and values of produced
items as well as average prices, enabling me to construct currency conversion factors bottom-
up. For the US I based my PPPs on the agricultural, mining and manufacturing reports of
the Thirteenth Census of the United States, all taken in the year 1909 (United States Depart-
ment of Commerce 1913b, 1913e, 1913d), as well as theMineral Resources of the Unites States
published as part of the United States Geological Survey for the year 1910 (United States
Department of the Interior 1911). For the UK I relied primarily on the First Census of Produc-
tion of 1907 and the 1908 Agricultural Output of Great Britain (Board of Trade 1912; Board of
Agriculture and Fisheries 1912). Supplementary information for UK agriculture came from
the Agricultural Statistics (Board of Agriculture and Fisheries 1911), while Fabricant (1940)
provided additional information for a number of American manufacturing industries.
Data on gross output, intermediate input, value added and employment was taken from
a variety of sources. For the US, I primarily relied on output data for the year 1909 from the
Historical Statistics (Carter et al. 2006), supplemented with data by King (1930), Fabricant
(1940) and the 1909 censuses of mining and manufacturing (United States Department of
Commerce 1913e, 1913d). 1909 employment data was taken from Kendrick (1961, 308) for
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Table 2: GDP per capita and unemployment, US and UK (1905–1913)
variables 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913
US GDPpc (1913=100) 75 84 85 79 88 89 92 96 100
UK GDPpc (1913=100) 87 89 91 87 89 92 95 96 100
US unemployment (%) 3.9 2.5 3.1 7.5 5.6 5.9 7.0 5.9 5.7
UK unemployment (%) 7.4 6.0 5.5 8.7 9.1 6.6 5.2 4.8 4.1
Sources: US and UK Gross Domestic Product per capita, see Maddison (2008, accessed on 11
March 2011); US unemployment, see Weir (1992, 341–3); UK unemployment, see Boyer and
Hatton (2002, 662).
all sectors except agriculture, which is based on figures by Lebergott (1964, 118). Total gross
domestic product is also based on Kendrick (1961, 296–7). For the UK, 1907 gross domes-
tic product, value added and employment are all based on figures by Feinstein (1972, 208;
1976, T10, T125–6, T131), which is supplemented by data on the use of intermediate in-
puts from the production censuses (Board of Agriculture and Fisheries 1912; Board of Trade
1912). Population data for both countries was taken from Maddison’s Historical Statistics
(Maddison 2008).
For the construction of the intermediate input PPPs, I relied on the 1899 American input-
output table byWhitney (1968) and the input-output table for Edwardian Britain by Thomas
(1984, 152). I adjusted the row and column totals for both the US and UK input-output
tables to match the level of gross output and intermediate input for the years 1909 and 1907
respectively. The totals for output and input were then translated to the cells of the matrix to
create a fit as close as possible to the original input-output table.
The choice of benchmark years was at least partly determined by the availability of the
production censuses listed above. For this benchmark comparison I took care to select two
stable years on the eve of the First World War. Whenever possible I selected data from 1907
for the UK and 1909 for the US respectively. Table 2 shows that the unemployment rate at
that point in time was relatively low or stable and that the actual per capita income level
for the census years chosen was close to those of 1910. I see this as an essential requirement
as I strive to determine the level of potential productivity diﬀerentials between the countries
under comparison. I thus aim to exclude the eﬀects of business cycles and capacity under-
utilization as much as possible, which, I am convinced, is the case for the selected census
years.5
5. See de Jong and Woltjer (2011) for an elaborate discussion of the business cycle and capacity utilization
eﬀects and a sensitivity analysis for the interwar period.
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Table 3: Gross output PPPs, US and UK (1909/07)
coverage (%) gross output PPP ($/£)a
Las- rel.
branch/sector matches US UK peyres Paasche Fisher exch.b
Agriculture 29 69 88 4.4 4.2 4.3 0.88
Mining 9 71 93 3.0 3.1 3.0 0.63
Manufacturing 111 33 46 5.5 4.6 5.1 1.04
Food, drink and tobacco 20 40 37 5.4 5.1 5.2 1.07
Textile and apparel 20 40 59 5.7 5.5 5.6 1.15
Lumber and wood products 3 7 1 4.0 3.9 3.9 0.81
Paper and printing 6 17 22 5.1 4.6 4.8 0.99
Chemicals and rubber 20 30 44 5.3 5.0 5.2 1.06
Petroleum and coal products 3 28 98 4.3 3.2 3.7 0.76
Leather and leather products 4 60 78 9.1 8.4 8.7 1.80
Stone, clay, and glass products 2 30 35 5.3 5.1 5.2 1.06
Metal industries 25 39 66 4.9 4.3 4.6 0.95
Machinery and transport eq. 5 20 19 4.8 4.0 4.4 0.90
Instruments and miscellaneous 3 9 4 8.2 7.4 7.8 1.60
a Sources: see text.
b Fisher gross output PPP relative to exchange rate (4.87). Source for exchange rate: Svennilson
(1954, 318–9).
3 Purchasing power parities
Table 3 presents my gross output PPP estimates at the sectoral level. These relative prices
were constructed on the basis of 149 ex-factory and ex-farm unit value ratios for both in-
termediate and final goods. The sample of products in this study ranges from wheat to pigs
meat for the agricultural sector, iron ore to petroleum in mining and jute yarn to sulfuric
acid in manufacturing; a complete list is presented in appendix B.
The number of matches for each sector and the value of these matched products in sec-
toral gross output (the coverage ratio) are shown in the first three columns of table 3. In
agriculture and mining I was able to cover nearly 90 percent of total gross output in the UK
and approximately 70 percent in the US. The coverage ratio for the manufacturing sector was
substantially lower, however, which is explained by the greater heterogeneity of products in
this sector, as well as the unique national character and qualitative diﬀerences of some of the
commodities produced. Nonetheless, I was able to cover well over 30 percent of the Amer-
ican and 40 percent of British manufacturing output. This is comparable to coverage ratios
found in previous prewar productivity studies (Fremdling, de Jong, and Timmer 2007b, 16;
de Jong and Woltjer 2009).
Table 3 shows substantial relative price diﬀerences between the three main sectors at
the start of the twentieth century. The last column of this table compares the Fisher output
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PPPs to the 1909 US/UK exchange rate. From this column we can see that the American
mining products, which primarily consisted of coal, iron ore and petroleum, were relatively
inexpensive as compared to the UK. In addition, American agricultural products were also
relatively cheap, especially when compared to the price level of manufactured goods. Note
that these large cross-industry variations in the output PPPs confirms that a uniform cur-
rency converter, such as the oﬃcial exchange rate, will not generate accurate productivity
comparisons at the sectoral level (Paige and Bombach 1959).
For this bilateral comparison, the weights of either the base country (UK) or the numer-
ator country (US) can be used, which provide a Laspeyres- and a Paasche-type PPP respec-
tively. The gap between both these indices can be interpreted as a measure of the structural
output diversity of both countries.6 Only for the manufacturing sector do my estimates show
a notable bias as the result of such structural diﬀerences (see table 3). The relatively low PPPs
in mining and agricultural therefore do not appear to be the result of product specialization,
but reflect the consistently lower American relative prices for the majority of sampled prod-
ucts in these sectors. Nonetheless, to overcome the potential structural bias, I rely on the
geometric average of the Laspeyres and Paasche indices, the Fisher index, as the currency
conversion factor for my productivity comparisons. As noted in section 2, this is considered
common practice in this type of research (van Ark 1993).
A further decomposition of the manufacturing sector oﬀers additional insights into the
price structure of these two economies. Table 3 reveals that the relative price diﬀerences
across the manufacturing industries were quite substantial. These price diﬀerences testify
to a specific pattern of industrial specialization, as already hinted at above by the substan-
tial Paasche-Laspeyres spread for manufacturing as a whole. Whereas the textiles industries
engaged the greatest share of British workers, American manufacturing was more geared to-
ward the production of heavy and durable goods (metals, machinery, etc.). This is reflected
in the relative price structure between the two countries as well. The PPP for the textile,
apparel and leather industries rise above the manufacturing average, while the gross output
PPP for metals and particularly the machinery and transportation equipment industries are
below-average. Even within these branches considerable structural diﬀerences existed, again
illustrated by the gap between the respective Paasche and Laspeyres PPPs. In the transporta-
tion equipment industries for instance, British producers were engaged primarily in the pro-
duction of ships while the US transportation sector had already shifted its focus toward the
production of automobiles.
6. Generally, using a single countries’ production shares as weights in the comparison will introduce a bias in
the PPP as the products which constitute a large share of the total production are those for which the country
sustains a comparative advantage and for which her prices will thus, by and large, be relatively low.
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Double deflation
The substantial diﬀerences in the gross output PPPs between the major sectors, observed in
table 3, hint at a potential gap between relative output and input prices. Particularly the
intermediate input PPPs for manufacturing industries that are dependent on inputs from
the agriculture or mining sectors (e.g. food and metal products) are likely to deviate sub-
stantially from the single deflated gross output PPPs. As noted by Fremdling, de Jong, and
Timmer (2007b, 13), “when relative prices of output and input diﬀer across countries, single
deflated productivitymeasuresmight bemisleading.” They demonstrate that “single deflated
measures can diverge substantially from double deflated measures when there are major dif-
ferences in the technical input-output coeﬃcients of an industry between two countries. This
might be due to, for example, diﬀerences in production methods, the type of materials used,
and the amount of imported material.”
Table 4 lists the intermediate input PPPs, in addition to the gross output PPPs discussed
above. As illustrated in section 2, the intermediate input PPPs are based on uvrs of interme-
diate products weighted by data on the flow of these goods from input-output tables.7 The
intermediate input PPPs show a large cross-industry variation, although not as large as those
observed for the gross output PPPs. The input PPPs for agriculture and particularly mining
are below average, whereas the industries that rely on (semi-) manufactured goods – apparel
and machinery, for instance – exhibit above-average PPPs.
On the basis of these gross output and intermediate input PPPs, I can now calculate the
double deflated value added PPPs; see equations (8)-(10). The results for these value added
PPPs are also shown in table 4. Given the similarity between input and output PPPs in the
agriculture and mining sectors, combined with a relatively low share of intermediate inputs
in gross output, the value added PPPs for these sectors stay close to the original single de-
flated output PPPs. For the manufacturing sector I do observe a notable gap between input
and output PPPs, however. Table 4 shows that the relative US/UK price level for outputs was
substantially higher than it was for inputs, which reflects the American access to cheap inter-
mediate inputs flowing from the agricultural and mining sectors. These inputs represented
a sizable portion of manufacturing gross output. For both countries, well over 50 percent
of gross output consisted of intermediate inputs. Overall, the PPP for value added is raised
by 13 percent (compared to the original manufacturing gross output PPP) to 5.74 $/£, well
above the oﬃcial exchange rate, which stood at 4.87 $/£ in 1909 (Svennilson 1954, 318–9).
7. For two manufacturing industries, leather and leather products and instruments and miscellaneous manu-
factures, information on the flow of inputs was missing, rendering the calculating of specific value added PPPs
impossible.
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Table 5: Comparative labor productivity, US and UK
(1909/07)
comparative labor productivity (UK=100)
single deflated double deflated Broadberry
branch/sector gross outputa value addeda & Irwinb
Agriculture 159 181 109
Mining 278 263 161
Manufacturing 198 214 209
a Sources: see text.
b Sources: Broadberry (1994a, 524; 1997b, 26–30) and Broadberry
and Irwin (2006, 261).
4 Comparative labor productivity
What new light do these PPP estimates shed on the international labor-productivity com-
parison debate? Table 5 presents the comparative labor-productivity estimates with the UK
as base-country. The first column of this table present the relative levels of gross output per
worker, converted on the basis of the single deflated Fisher PPPs listed in table 4. The sec-
ond column presents the comparative levels of real value added per worker, converted using
the double deflated Fisher PPPs of table 4. The latter represents my preferred estimate of
Anglo-American productivity around 1910. The last column lists the figures by Broadberry
and Irwin, the original benchmark of US/UK productivity for the early twentieth century.
Broadberry and Irwin estimate productivity on the basis of a direct comparison of physical
quantities of output per worker which, as discussed in appendix A, makes them conceptually
comparable to the single deflated productivity estimates listed in the first column of table 5.
So far my findings are in line with a large body of literature discussing the compara-
tive advantages of the American economy during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century. The double deflated productivity figures in table 5 confirm the existence of a large
transatlantic productivity gap in manufacturing, a phenomenon which has been extensively
documented (Rostas 1948; Broadberry 1997a; Field 2003; Gordon 2004). I find that the US
manufacturing productivity level was about 214 percent of the UK. My new estimates under-
line the US dominance in mining productivity as well, even though I do find a substantially
greater Anglo-American productivity gap for this sector than originally reported by Broad-
berry and Irwin. Contrary to the consensus view, however, the present study also highlights
the comparatively strong performance of the American agricultural sector. Below I will show
that these upward revisions of sectoral productivity levels, particularly those for agricul-
ture, raise the benchmark estimate of American total-economy productivity relative to the
UK. This brings my aggregate estimates much closer to the GDP per worker and GDP per
capita figures reported by Ward and Devereux and directly challenge the conclusions made
by Broadberry and Irwin. Prior to discussing the results at the total-economy level, I will first
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discuss the origin and rational behind the revisions for each of the major sectors individually.
Agriculture
The main source for the discrepancy in the agricultural labor productivity estimates is not
the method of productivity comparison – as Broadberry and Irwin also applied the ICOP
approach here – but is the underlying figure of US value added per worker for this sector.
The double deflated figures of value added per worker, listed in table 5, appraise American
agriculture at 181 percent of the UK level. Broadberry and Irwin cite an estimate of 109. Table
6 provides an overview of the sources and figures behind both Anglo-American comparisons
of agricultural productivity. In an earlier study, on which Broadberry and Irwin base their
estimate, Broadberry (1997b, 27) lists a US net output per employee value of 347$. I base
my considerably higher estimate of 488$ per worker on the value added figures listed in the
Historical Statistics (Carter et al. 2006, 4:193) and the agricultural employment reported by
Lebergott (1964, 510). Although the estimation of employment and particularly value added
in agriculture is considerably more diﬃcult than it is for other sectors, none of the primary
sources point in the direction of a figure as low as suggested by Broadberry.8
Although Broadberry (1994a, 524) does not list the value added and employment figures
underlying his labor productivity figures in US agriculture directly, they can be implicitly
derived on the basis of the sectoral employment shares listed in his paper. Table 6 shows that
this employment figure broadly matches the estimate by Lebergott (1964, 510), on which I
rely. Total value added in the agricultural sector, derived from the productivity figure listed
by Broadberry and the implicit employment estimate, lies considerably below my own mea-
sure, however. Broadberry’s figure of approximately 3,875 million dollars does not appear to
be supported by any of the primary sources available, which cite figures of total value added
in American agriculture ranging from 5,780 million to 6,077 million dollars in 1909 (Carter
et al. 2006, 4:193; United States Department of Agriculture 2011). Broadberry’s underesti-
mation of American agricultural output by over 30 percent accounts for a large share of the
diﬀerence between his comparative productivity figure and those presented in the present
study.
In addition, net output per worker in the British agricultural sector appears to be over-
stated by Broadberry (1997b, 27); 78£ versus my estimate of 64£ (Feinstein 1972, 208; 1976,
T60, T131; Board of Agriculture and Fisheries 1912, 17, 26; Board of Trade 1912, 20). The
higher estimate by Broadberry is the result of his choice to exclude the agricultural pro-
duction in Ireland from his productivity estimate. This, however, is inconsistent with the
definition used by Feinstein as well as his own industrial benchmark. I reincorporated Irish
8. Cited estimates of US value added per worker in 1910 range from 426$ to 575$. For alternative sources on
employment see: Kendrick (1961, 308), Carter et al. (2006, 4:77), and United States Department of Commerce
(1913c, 40; 1914, 229; 1943, 104). For alternative sources on agricultural output see: United States Department
of Agriculture (2011) and United States Department of Commerce (1913b, 474, 494, 505, 517, 519, 532).
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production and employment in the productivity figures and made a (minor) revision to the
PPP – from 4.12 $/£ listed by Broadberry (1997b, 27) to 4.20 $/£.
These adjustments to the productivity estimates listed above are not only in line with
those suggested in a recent paper by Ward and Devereux (2005, 267–8), they also substanti-
ate Habakkuk’s claim of relatively high levels of productivity in American agriculture. In his
monograph, Habakkuk (1962, 11–4) argues that during the nineteenth century “America[n]
improvements in agriculture took the form primarily of increasing output per head and the
increase initially was probably more rapid than in industry; in England on the other hand,
agricultural improvement was devoted primarily to increasing yields per acre.” Reflecting
his well-known thesis for industry, Habakkuk contends that the abundance of resources
and scarcity of (skilled) labor in the US forced American farmers to pursue capital-intensive
methods of production. Machinery and particularly land were substituted for labor, resulting
in high levels of labor productivity. The importance of labor-saving innovations also features
prominently in subsequent accounts of the American agricultural development, stressing the
relative productivity of this sector in international perspective (Hayami and Ruttan 1985).
Furthermore, Olmstead and Rhode (2008) demonstrate the importance of biological innova-
tions in the form of improved crops and livestock. These biological innovations allowed the
farm frontier to be pushed to the drier and harsher West and North, continuously expand-
ing the available land for cultivation. This depressed the price of farmland in relation to
labor even further. These developments allowed American agriculture to become regionally
specialized, reaping all the benefits of returns-to-scale and raising productivity levels in the
process.
The developments in American agriculture should not be viewed in isolation. As noted
in section 1, it appears highly unlikely that the American agricultural sector was left entirely
unaﬀected by the rapid developments in industry during the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth century. Demand for agricultural goods increased dramatically, both from the domestic
as well as the international market, while the wage-level continued to rise, reflecting the siz-
able labor productivity gains in industry. Had productivity levels in agriculture remained
stagnant, it would have become even more diﬃcult to attract labor from the industrial areas
of the US. This in itself would have provided further incentive for farmers to economize on
labor and adopt even more land-intensive forms of agriculture, raising labor productivity
in the process. Over and above, American industry provided farmers with cheap fertilizers,
energy and farm machinery which had the eﬀect of raising the output per acre as well as
allowing farmers to work greater stretches of land unaided.
In the UK land was scarce and there were few opportunities to expand the arable acreage.
Consequently, British farmers primarily adopted land-saving, as opposed to labor-saving im-
provements and were mostly interested in raising the output per acre (Habakkuk 1962, 101–
2). In an attempt to overcome this barrier, from the 1840s to the 1870s – the period known as
‘high farming’ – a fair amount of new acreage was added, mostly through drainage (Turner
18
2004, 139). Still, this investment came at considerable expense and the supplemental farm-
land, approximately 4.5 million acres, was not enough to overcome the constraints posed
by land-scarcity on the growth prospects of British agriculture. Doubt could thus be cast on
the appropriateness of the designation ‘high farming’, as it is not evident that the addition
of arable acreage made strict economic sense. From 1870 up to the First World War, other
forms of land-saving technologies developed rapidly and began to spread across British agri-
culture; the primary applications were the use of chemical fertilizers and concentrated feeds
(van Zanden 1991, 231–2).When compared to otherWestern-European countries though, the
average consumption of fertilizers in the UK was still relatively low, while the level of con-
sumption of imported animal feeds stagnated after 1880. In contrast to the US and parts of
Europe, the improvements in labor-saving technology in late nineteenth and early twentieth
century Britain were limited and the main agricultural activities remained largely dependent
on draft animals and human labor (van Zanden 1991, 234).
As noted by Turner (2004, 133; 144), British agriculture appears to have been in more or
less unremitting decline from 1860 down to the First World War. The UK became more and
more dependent on imports of agricultural goods to satisfy the needs of the ever-growing
urban population. Initially this flow of imports was composed largely of cash crops, such
as wheat from North America. The influx of cheap grains caused a sharp realignment of
the agricultural sector from crop production toward a livestock economy. In the 1860s and
1870s, Britain’s isolated position and legislation still aﬀorded the livestock producers some
respite from foreign competition, and livestock’s share in total agricultural output increased
to well over 50 percent during the decades to follow. Yet, by the 1880s the free-trade policies
and the development of chilled transportation opened the British meat market to foreign
competition. Turner (2004, 134) shows that, “the benefits of bulk carriage and the attendant
economies of scale meant that even after incurring substantial freight charges many over-
seas suppliers from the 1880s could compete more successfully in home markets than home
producers.”
The inability of British farmers to compete with foreign competitors and the substantial
imports of American agricultural produce appear to support my finding of comparatively
low levels of productivity in the British agricultural sector. This also aligns with the esti-
mates by Ó Gráda (1994, 148–9) of TFP growth in the range of 0.4 percent per year between
1870 and 1910, which in comparison to the US and other European countries was fairly slow
(van Zanden 1991, 229). Whereas American agriculture took full advantage of the major
improvements in labor-saving technologies prior to 1910, British improvements focused pri-
marily on the saving of land. By and large British farmers had trouble adapting to the rapidly
changing economic and social conditions (van Zanden 1991, 237–8).
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Table 7:Value added and employment shares in mining, US and UK (%,
1909/07)
United States (1909)a United Kingdom (1907)b
branch/sector value added employment value added employment
Coal 49.3 68.8 91.0 87.9
Iron ore 8.8 4.8 1.5 1.2
Other metals 19.4 10.7 1.1 1.9
Fuel oils 13.9 4.4 1.3 1.0
Miscellaneous 8.5 11.3 5.1 8.1
Total mining 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: United States Department of Commerce (1913d, 24).
b Source: Board of Trade (1912, 39).
Mining
The estimate of labor productivity for mining by Broadberry and Irwin again appears to
understate the relative lead of the US in comparison to the UK. The double deflated figures
of value added per worker, listed in table 5, appraise American mining at 263 percent of the
UK level. Broadberry and Irwin cite an estimate of 161. The main source for the discrepancy
between both benchmark estimates is the method of productivity comparison. Broadberry
and Irwin rely on Rostas’ original quantity approach and estimate comparative productivity
in mining solely on the basis of the physical production of coal and iron ore. Even though
coal and iron ore comprise the bulk of output and employment in this sector, as shown in
table 7, by focusing solely on these two items Broadberry and Irwin ignore the contribution
of other upcoming mining products, most notably gas and fuel oils (e.g. petroleum).9
The average value added per wage earner in these uncovered mining branches – at least
for the American mining sector – was substantially greater than that observed in coal and
iron ore mining. Table 7 shows that the nonferrous metal ores, fuel oils and miscellaneous
mining branches covered approximately 26 percent of employment and 42 percent of value
added in US mining, raising the average labor productivity by about 27 percent when I in-
clude these to the coal and iron ore sample. For the UK, coal and iron ore already encom-
passed 89 percent of mining employment and about 93 percent of value added. Here, the
addition of the other mining branches actually lowers the average value added per worker
for the total British mining sector by 4 percent. The complete coverage of mining, which is
made possible by the use of the ICOP methodology, thus raises the comparative productivity
9. Even though the share of oil and natural gas in the world’s total energy consumption was still fairly low
prior to the First World War (approximately 5.9 percent), their relative contribution to the total power supply
increased rapidly in the decades to follow; by 1935 the share of these commodities in the world’s power supply
had risen to just over 20 percent. The American reliance on gas and oil was substantial greater than it was in the
UK, however. According to the International Labour Oﬃce (1938, 33–6), in 1936 the American share of oil and
gas in the total energy consumption was 37.4 percent, whereas the British share was only 8.7 percent.
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Table 8: Comparative labor productivity in coal mining, US and UK
(1909/07)
output per comparative
worker PPP productivity
unit US UK ($/£) (UK=100)
Quantity: Broadberrya tons/worker 530 326 163
Quantity: McCloskeyb tons/worker 613 325 188
ICOP: uvr ‘coal: total’c go/worker 826 146 3.01 188
ICOP: Fisher PPPd go/worker 826 146 2.78 203
a Source: Broadberry (1997b, 27).
b Source:McCloskey (1971, 291).
c Sources: Board of Trade (1912, 42, 44) and United States Department of Commerce
(1913d, 186). The employment figures for the US were adjusted to exclude coke
workers and take peak employment into account, while British employment was
corrected for absenteeism and excludes iron miners working under the Coal Mines
Regulation Act; see McCloskey (1971, 291). The price deflator is based on the unit
value ratio for all coal combined, see table 9.
d Sources: see c. The price deflator is based on the Fisher PPP for coal, see table 9.
estimate by over 30 percent in favor of the US, accounting for a large part of the discrepancy
between my new estimate and the original Broadberry and Irwin benchmark.
Apart from its limited coverage, the figure cited by Broadberry and Irwin also appears
to understate productivity in coal mining directly. Given coal’s large share in mining out-
put, the estimate for this branch has serious implications for both Broadberry and Irwin’s as
well as my own estimation of overall mining productivity. Broadberry and Irwin’s estimate
is based on earlier work by Broadberry (1997b, 27), who cites the total tonnage of coal ex-
tracted and the number of wage earners in American and British coal mining. In his figures
Broadberry erroneously includes the labor and output of the coke production at the Ameri-
can collieries. This lowers his estimate of output per worker for the US substantially. In an
earlier study, McCloskey (1971, 291) uses identical methods and sources to compare Anglo-
American productivity in the coal mining branch, but he adjusts the output and employment
figures to exclude the production of coke. Table 8 lists both these estimates and the under-
lying country-specific output per worker figures, showing McCloskey’s comparative US/UK
productivity figure for coal mining to come out substantially higher at 188 compared to the
Broadberry estimate of 163.10
On the basis of the same sources as McCloskey, but comparing the gross output value per
10. An international comparison of the coal-mining industry by the International Labour Oﬃce (1938) reports
an even greater gap in productivity between the US and UK. Comparing the output of bituminous coal per
man-shift in 1913 they observe an average production of 3,270 kg. per shift in the US and only 1,090 in Britain.
Relative to other European countries, productivity in the UK was slightly above-average; productivity in the
German Ruhr area was approximately 943 kg. per shift; for Belgium the International Labour Oﬃce (1938, 109)
reports a figure of 528; 701 for France; 820 for the Netherlands; and 1,202 for the East Upper Silesia region in
Poland.
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Table 9: Relative price of coal, US and UK (1909/07)
United States (1909)a United Kingdom (1907)b
quantity value unit value quantity value unit value uvr
(ton, mln.) ($, mln.) ($/ton) (ton, mln.) (£, mln.) (£/ton) ($/£)
coal: anthracite 73.5 149.4 2.03 4.0 2.3 0.58 3.51
coal: bituminous 344.5 405.5 1.18 266.9 117.3 0.44 2.68
coal: total 418.0 554.9 1.33 270.8 119.6 0.44 3.01
Laspeyres Paasche Fisher
PPP 2.69 2.86 2.78
a Sources: United States Department of the Interior (1911) and
United States Department of Commerce (1911, 202–4).
b Source: Board of Trade (1912, 42).
wage earner instead, I arrive at an identical level of comparative productivity (see row 3 in
table 8). For this estimate, I converted US gross output per wage earner to British Pounds
Sterling on the basis of the ratio of the American and British unit values for all types of coal
combined.11 This is in line with the approach taken by Broadberry and McCloskey who also
aggregated the total tonnage of coal excavated prior to comparing the quantity output per
worker. The aggregation of the total tonnage and output value of coal implicitly ignores the
variations in the quality and price for the diﬀerent types of coal, however. Table 9 illustrates
that in both countries the price for anthracite coal was markedly higher than the price for
bituminous coal and that the share of the former in the output of the American coal mining
branch was also substantially greater than the share of anthracite in British coal produc-
tion. As an alternative measure, using equations (3)-(5), I estimated a new purchasing power
parity for coal, taking both the price variations and the diﬀerent value shares of anthracite
and bituminous coal into account. This Fisher PPP was then used to re-estimate comparative
productivity in table 8, resulting in a US/UK productivity level of 203.
The example of coal mining above highlights both the similarities between the quantity
and the ICOP approach as well as the potential advantages of the latter. Based on the same
sources, a direct comparison of the tonnage of coal per worker yields an identical productiv-
ity estimate as a comparison of the per worker value of coal production (based on the unad-
justed average price of coal). The capacity of the ICOP approach to account for diﬀerences
in prices between the various commodities produced within the same industry distinguishes
it from the original quantity approach, however. Still, it should be noted that the quality
adjustment illustrated above does not guarantee that the products being compared are fully
equivalent between the two countries. The chemical composition of coal (e.g. carbon, mois-
11. The unit values and unit value ratios for coal are based on equations (1) and (2). The underlying quantity
and value data and sources are given in table 9.
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ture or volatile content) as well as the physical characteristics – which can diﬀer markedly
between geological regions – ultimately determine the suitability for specific consumption
purposes.12 In the early twentieth century, the world’s coal markets recognized hundreds of
individual classifications of coal, illustrating that the distinction between anthracite and bi-
tuminous coal is still quite rough.13 Nonetheless, the expanded sample of products discussed
previously, as well as the reliance on value added and sectoral employment figures and the
application of double deflation in the present study, yields a markedly higher and, in my
opinion, more representative estimate for the comparative Anglo-American productivity in
the mining sector as a whole.
The superior performance of the American mining sector can, in part, be explained by
the sheer quantity and quality of natural resources in this country. For the coal-mining sec-
tor, McCloskey (1971, 293) shows that the “American seams were generally thicker, closer to
the surface, freer from faults, flatter and drier than British seams.” The favorable geological
conditions allowed American miners to introduce new mechanized methods of production
and work considerably more eﬃciently than their British counterparts. Taylor (1961, 58-9)
also emphasizes the British mine-owners conservative attitude toward the adoption of new
innovations and technologies through, for instance, the late adoption of electricity as well
as the hesitant introduction of the mechanized coal-cutter in the British mines.14 As was
the case for agriculture, American miners took full advantage of the major improvements
in labor-saving technologies during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, whereas
British improvements focused primarily on overcoming the diminishing returns to land as
the coal and ore deposits were slowly being exhausted (McCloskey 1971, 289–90). These de-
velopments drove a wedge between the labor productivity levels of both countries, resulting
in a productivity ratio in the mining sector of 2.63 to 1 in favor of the US.
Manufacturing
As illustrated in table 5, the estimate of labor productivity in manufacturing by Broadberry
and Irwin is actually very close to my own double deflated value added per worker figure for
this sector. Broadberry and Irwin estimate a US/UK comparative productivity level of 209
versus my estimate of 214. Both these estimates confirm the existence of a large transatlantic
productivity gap for manufacturing in the early twentieth century. Britain’s falling behind
during the nineteenth century and its inability to catch-up has been extensively documented
and has traditionally been explained by diﬀerences in factor and resource endowments as
well as demand patterns (Habakkuk 1962; Broadberry 1997a; Field 2003; Gordon 2004). The
abundance of land and natural resources in the US gave rise to more capital- and resource-
12. The International Labour Oﬃce (1938, 17–24) report on the world coal-mining industry provides an exten-
sive description of the characteristics of diﬀerent ranks and grades of coal and their consumption purposes.
13. Neither the British nor the American census fully distinguish between bituminous, sub-bituminous and
even lignite. See, United States Department of Commerce (1911, 203) and Board of Trade (1912, 42–3).
14. See also, Walters (1975, 296).
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Table 10: Comparative labor productivity in manufacturing, US and UK
(1909/07)
comparative labor productivity (UK=100)
single deflated double deflated Broadberry
industry/sector gross output value added & Irwina
Food, drink and tobacco 200 155 146
Textile, apparel and leather 157 184 151
Chemicals, petroleum and rubber 169 176 143
Metal industries 203 224 288
Engineering and transport eq. 227 268 203
Miscellaneous 216 239 227
Manufacturing 198 214 209
a Sources: Broadberry and Irwin (2006, 261) and Broadberry (1994a, 524).
intensive production, a process which was further facilitated by a relatively homogenous
demand for goods (Broadberry 1994b, 291). In contrast, in Britain natural resources were
scarce while skilled labor was in ample supply, providing an incentive to economize on fixed
capital in the form of machinery (Temin 1971, 162). The role played by resources in the
Anglo-American manufacturing productivity gap is underscored by the relatively low input
PPP for manufacturing, presented in table 4, which illustrates the American access to cheap
intermediates flowing from the agricultural and mining sectors.
Table 10 shows that the new comparative labor productivity figures for the underlying
industries deviate more substantially from the original estimates. Still, the overall picture
sketched by Broadberry and Irwin remains intact. American producers excelled in the pro-
duction of durable goods (e.g. metal, engineering and wood products), while the British
manufactures were relatively productive in the non-durable industries (e.g. food, textile and
chemicals). As noted by Broadberry (1994b, 523), the industry-specific productivity results
are also broadly in line with the figures on revealed comparative advantage in British and
American manufacturing trade by Crafts and Thomas (1986, 639).
A comparison of the real gross output and real value added figures in table 10 reveals
that the application of the double deflation procedure can have a significant impact on the
productivity estimates. As previously noted, the use of gross output in international bench-
mark comparisons introduces a potential bias as a result of diﬀerences in the share of inter-
industry deliveries in the value of production. This is of importance particularly when the
ratio of intermediate inputs to gross output varies between countries as well as industries.
These variations can occur as a result of diﬀerences in production methods, the types of ma-
terials used, and the amount of imported materials, but can also be caused by diﬀerences in
industry classifications between the countries under comparison (Fremdling, de Jong, and
Timmer 2007a, 360). In addition, as discussed in section 3, double deflation takes both rela-
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tive prices of output and inputs into account. The diﬀerence between the use of value added
instead of gross output for the productivity comparison is most evident for the engineering
and transportation equipment sector. Here the relative input and output prices vary only
marginally, but the share of input in gross output is relatively high in the UK (see table 4).
Consequently, British gross output is inflated by the large share of intermediates used in the
production process and will considerably overestimate the added value of British machine
builders in comparison to their American counterparts. In contrast, the share of intermediate
inputs in the food, drink and tobacco industry is roughly identical for the UK and the US (73
and 71 percent respectively), but the use of relatively cheap agricultural inputs in the US
leads to a considerable upward adjustment of the value added PPP. Taking the relative prices
for outputs as well as inputs into account thus results in a substantial downward adjustment
of the comparative productivity figure for this industry.
In appendix A, I demonstrate that the quantity approach – the method on which Broad-
berry and Irwin rely – is conceptually on the same footing as mymeasure of real gross output
per worker. For the textile, apparel and leather as well as the engineering and transportation
equipment industries, the gap between the new productivity figures and the original esti-
mates by Broadberry and Irwin appear to be explained by the latter’s implicit reliance on
gross output instead of value added. The moderate upward revision for the productivity es-
timates in the chemical industries illustrates another one of the drawbacks of the quantity
approach. Because of the complex structure of the chemical industries and the heteroge-
neous nature of its products, it is simply not possible to aggregate the quantities produced
to a single measure or to assign labor to the various products. The assignment of labor used
to produce a single good, as discussed in appendix A, is economically less sensible when the
share of output for that good only comprises a small fraction of the total production value
in that industry. As a result, the Broadberry and Irwin estimate for chemicals is primarily
based on those chemical industries that produce a single or homogeneous set of products
(e.g. seed crushing, coke, soap, fertilizers), disregarding the biggest industry in this sector:
basic chemicals.
Hours of work
So far the productivity figures have been expressed solely in terms of output per worker. I
implicitly assumed the average length of the working week as well as the number of vacation
and holidays to be identical in both countries. This assumption is born out of necessity, un-
fortunately, as detailed figures on hours of work are generally unavailable for most sectors
in the early twentieth century. For the manufacturing industries, however, statistics on the
length of the working week are available. Table 11 provides an overview of the weekly and
annual hours of work in both countries.
The UK figures in table 11 were taken from the British Labour Statistics (Great Britain
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Table 11:Weekly and annual average hours worked in manufacturing, US and
UK (1909/06)
United States (1909)a United Kingdom (1906)b
weekly annual weekly annual
branch/sector hours hours hours hours
Food, drink and tobacco 54.7 2,722 54.4 2,657
Textile, apparel and leather 54.2 2,697 53.9 2,631
Chemicals, petroleum and rubber 56.9 2,827 53.2 2,597
Metal industries 55.5 2,760 53.1 2,593
Engineering and transport eq. 54.2 2,692 53.2 2,596
Miscellaneous 54.3 2,699 53.6 2,617
Manufacturing 54.7 2,718 53.7 2,619
a Sources: United States Department of Commerce (1913e, 316–9), Jones (1963, 375), and
Huberman and Minns (2007, 546).
b Sources: Great Britain Department of Employment and Productivity (1971, 95) and
Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee (1982, 566).
Department of Employment and Productivity 1971, 95), which contains detailed statistics
on the 1906 average hours of work per week for nearly all of the large industries within the
British manufacturing sector.15 The American industry-specific estimates were taken from
the Census of Manufactures (United States Department of Commerce 1913e, 316–9) and the
work of Jones (1963, 375). Data from Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee (1982, 566) on
the number of vacations and holidays in Britain and Huberman and Minns (2007, 546) for
the US allowed me to estimate the annual totals for hours worked. Overall, the length of the
average working week was fairly similar between the US and the UK. American manufactur-
ing wage-earners worked, on average, 1 additional hour per week compared to the British
wage earners. The relative gap in the annual hours of work is slightly larger as a result of the
greater number of vacation and holidays in the UK.
Table 12 presents the labor productivity statistics on a person-hour basis. The industry-
specific employment data have been multiplied by the data on annual hours of work taken
from table 11. Given the comparable length of the average working week in the UK and the
US, the hourly productivity estimates do not deviate much from the per worker figures. The
hour-adjusted figures indicate that overall manufacturing productivity in the US stood at ca.
207 percent of the UK level, approximately 7 percentage points below the per worker esti-
mate. At the detailed industry level, the drop in measured labor productivity ranged from 4
percentage points (food, drink and tobacco) to 14 percentage points (chemicals, petroleum
and rubber). Overall, the per hour figures confirm the existence of a large transatlantic pro-
ductivity gap in manufacturing, in the order of approximately 2:1, at the start of the twenti-
eth century.
15. Note that I assume the average length of the working week to remain unchanged between 1906 and 1907.
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Table 12: Real value added per worker and per hour in
manufacturing, US and UK (1909/07)
value added value added
per worker per hour
branch/sector (% US/UK) (% US/UK)
Food, drink and tobacco 155 151
Textile, apparel and leather 184 180
Chemicals, petroleum and rubber 176 162
Metal industries 224 211
Engineering and transport eq. 268 258
Miscellaneous 239 232
Manufacturing 214 207
Sources: see tables 10 and 11.
5 Total economy
In order to assess the impact of the new sectoral benchmarks on the overall productivity lev-
els of the two countries, table 13 presents the reconciliation of comparative GDP per worker
and per capita for the US and the UK. As a first step in the output based estimate of com-
parative productivity, I calculated a PPP deflator at the total economy level. This PPP is a
weighted average of the value added PPPs for the agricultural, mining and manufacturing
sectors listed in table 4, supplemented with implicit price deflators for the construction and
service sectors. The latter are based on the comparative productivity estimates for these two
sectors by Broadberry and Irwin (2006, 261) which, when combined with the nominal value
added per worker data listed in table 13, yield the comparative price levels at the sectoral
level.
The PPP for total economy, at 6.14 $/£, comes out considerably higher than the oﬃcial
exchange rate at 4.87 $/£. In a study of the relative cost of living in Britain and the US,
Williamson (1995, 184) obtains a fairly similar PPP of 6.48 $/£, however. This PPP, based on
the relative prices of primarily food stuﬀs and rents, appears to corroborate the finding of a
comparatively high American price level.
On the basis of the estimates of GDP at factor costs and total employment, the total econ-
omy PPP can be utilized to compare output per worker between the two countries. As shown
in table 13, I find a US GDP per worker level of about 138 percent of the UK. This is nearly 10
percent above the original industry-of-origin estimate by Broadberry and Irwin (2006, 261)
– who value the American output per worker at 125 percent of the British level. The new
estimate puts the US comfortably in the lead in terms of total economy labor productivity at
the start of the twentieth century.
As noted by Broadberry (1998, 386), “the aggregate comparative level of labor produc-
tivity at a point in time is the result not only of the levels of comparative labor productivity
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Table 13: Comparative labor productivity and income, US and UK
(1909/07)
employment value added per
shares (%) PPPc worker/capita
branch/sector USa UKb ($/£) US ($)d UK (£)e US/UKf
Agriculture 32.8 11.8 4.2 488 64 181
Industry 29.1 43.5 5.6 1,026 89 206
Mining 3.0 6.3 3.0 860 110 263
Manufacturing 21.3 32.1 5.7 1,063 86 214
Construction 4.8 5.1 9.1 970 80 134
Services 38.0 44.7 7.2 1,137 132 119
GDP per workerg 100.0 100.0 6.1 892 105 138
GDP per capitah 6.1 354 46 126
a Sources: Kendrick (1961, 296–7, 308) and Lebergott (1964, 118).
b Source: Feinstein (1976, 131).
c Fisher value added PPPs from table 4. PPPs in italics were derived implicitly from the
value added per worker figures in the last three columns of this table.
d Sources: Carter et al. (2006), King (1930), and Fabricant (1940).
e Source: Feinstein (1972, 208).
f Double deflated value added per worker estimates from table 5. Productivity figures
in italics were taken from Broadberry and Irwin (2006, 261).
g Sources: Feinstein (1976, T10, T125–6), Kendrick (1961, 296–7, 308), and Lebergott
(1964, 118).
h Population figures from Maddison (2008).
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Table 14: Diﬀerent approaches to estimate comparative GDP per
capita, US and UK (ca. 1910)
rel. GDP p.
author approach year capita (UK=100)
This study ICOP 1909/07 126
Ward & Devereux Expenditure 1905 122
Broadberry & Irwin Quantity relatives 1909/11 113
Broadberry & Irwin Expenditure 1909/11 105
Maddison 1990 GK$ 1910 108
Maddison 1985 GK$ 1910 125
Maddison 1970 GK$ 1910 127
Sources:Ward and Devereux (2003, 2006), Broadberry and Irwin (2006), and
Maddison (2001, 1991, 1982).
in each sector but also of diﬀerences in the structure of employment.” Table 13 shows that a
large share of the American labor force was engaged in agriculture, while in the UK the labor
force was concentrated in the high value-added service sectors. These structural diﬀerences
provided the UK with a notable advantage – as value added per worker was substantially
lower in agriculture than in industry or services – helping to explain the relatively modest
lead in GDP per worker despite the large US/UK productivity gap in agriculture and indus-
try (Broadberry and Irwin 2006, 263). Had the structure of the labor force been identical
between the US and the UK at the start of the twentieth century, then the level of US output
per worker would have been between 150 and 157 percent of the British level, depending on
whether the US or UK employment shares from table 13 are applied.
On the basis of Maddison’s figures for the 1909 American and 1907 British population,
an estimate of comparative GDP per capita can also be derived.16 Table 14 compares this
estimate with previous attempts to measure economy-wide income diﬀerences between the
two countries. My industry-of-origin estimate is set against the expenditure-based productiv-
ity calculations by Ward and Devereux, the estimates by Broadberry and Irwin, and various
versions of the Maddison data-set expressed in 1970, 1985 and 1990 international Geary-
Khamis dollars respectively.
Overall, my Anglo-American GDP per capita estimate is higher than the figures suggested
by Broadberry and Maddison. I appraise the American relative income per capita level to be
126 percent of the UK, which is actually very close to the figures provided by Ward and
Devereux. It is interesting to note that my estimate also approximates the earlier estimates
by Maddison, expressed in 1985 or 1970 dollars. This similarity seems to suggest that the
earlier benchmarks of international dollars reflect the actual price diﬀerences around 1910
better than the later benchmarks, backing up earlier claims in this respect by Prados de la
16. Note that the GDP per capita figures are based on the estimates of GDP at factor costs and PPP deflator
listed in table 13.
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Figure 1: Comparative GDP per capita, US and UK (UK=100, 1870–1930)
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Sources: Benchmark 1909/07 based on double deflated estimate listed in table 13. Time series output
and population, see Maddison (2008). Broadberry and Irwin (2006, 270) and Ward and Devereux
(2003, 840).
Escosura (2000).
A backward projection of my benchmark estimates on existing time-series again yield
some interesting conclusions. Figure 1 summarizes the main findings of the changes in rela-
tive income levels. For the time series I rely on figures by Maddison (2008), allowing me to
compare the extrapolated GDP per capita figures against the Anglo-American comparative
per capita income figures by Broadberry and Irwin (2006, 261).
The estimates by Broadberry and Irwin (2006, 269) show a substantial British lead in per
capita income terms between 1870 and 1890. According to their estimates, the US overtook
the UK in GDP per capita not until 1910. My benchmark extrapolation dates the overtaking
considerably earlier. I find that around 1870 the UK enjoyed a small lead in per capita income
terms. By 1880 this lead had dissipated and between 1880 to 1900 the US level of GDP per
capita remained roughly on par with the UK. During the first three decades of the twentieth
century, however, the US charged ahead and the income gap widened to nearly 60 percent in
the 1920s.
Even though my new estimate of relative GDP per capita is very similar to the early twen-
tieth century benchmark by Ward and Devereux, the long-run trend illustrated in figure 1
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does not correspond well to their nineteenth century expenditure benchmarks. As noted in
section 1, Ward and Devereux show the US leading in terms of income per capita as early
as 1872. In addition, they estimate a considerable gap in relative income levels between the
US and the UK throughout the 1872–1905 period. On the basis of the new industry-of-origin
benchmark and time-series evidence, I come to the conclusion that this appears to overstate
the actual relative American income level in comparison to the UK. Still, the 1909/07 bench-
mark confirms the existence of a large gap in comparative productivity between the US and
the UK in agriculture and industry and provides strong evidence for a sizable American ad-
vantage in terms of GDP per worker and GDP per capita at the start of the twentieth century.
6 Conclusion
This study oﬀers a new benchmark for agriculture, mining and five manufacturing branches
in the US and the UK around 1910. On the basis of the ICOP approach, I measure the value of
net output by industry translated to a common currency on the basis of sector-specific dou-
ble deflated PPPs. This procedure takes both the diﬀerences in the relative prices of outputs
as well as inputs into account, which proved to be of particularly importance for the pro-
ductivity estimate of the manufacturing sector. In this sector I observe a notable gap in the
relative PPPs for inputs and outputs, reflecting the American access to cheap intermediate
inputs flowing from the agricultural and mining sectors.
The new benchmark estimates confirm the existence of a large transatlantic productiv-
ity gap in manufacturing, supporting earlier claims to this eﬀect by Rostas and Broadberry.
Contrary to the consensus view, however, I demonstrate that the Atlantic productivity gap in
the early twentieth century extended to mining and agricultural sectors as well. Industrial
productivity in the US stood at ca. 206 percent of the UK level, while American agriculture
maintained a lead of 181 percent against its British counterpart. I show that American farm-
ers took full advantage of labor-saving technologies, greatly improving their productivity
level in comparison to the British farmers who focused instead on the saving of land. In sim-
ilar vein, productivity in British mining was hampered by the relative hesitant introduction
of technological improvements and unfavorable geological conditions.
The substantial US lead in agriculture and industry provides firm evidence for a strong
overall lead in total economy productivity. However, as argued by Broadberry, diﬀerences
in the employment structure between both economies did play a role in the relative income
and productivity diﬀerentials. The low share of British employees in the agricultural sec-
tor provided Britain with a structural advantage that substantially reduced the gap in the
overall level of productivity between the US and the UK. Applying the new benchmark esti-
mates for ca. 1910 to long term projections of value added and total population back into the
nineteenth century reveals an interesting new perspective on the dynamics of comparative
long-term economic development, suggesting an earlier American takeover in terms of GDP
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per capita.
Rather than oﬀering any definitive answers to the questions of long run economic growth
and dynamics, my new benchmark estimate serves as a starting point for further investiga-
tions based on an industry-of-origin approach. A lot of work remains to be done on improving
the quality of time-series of gross output, value added and employment for the nineteenth
century, and in many cases the early twentieth century as well. In addition, expanding and
improving estimates of service sector productivity is crucial to arrive at a more complete
picture of convergence and divergence of income and productivity levels since the industrial
revolution.
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A Benchmark methods compared
Although the basic concepts behind the available industry-of-origin benchmark techniques
are similar, there are some marked diﬀerences between the ICOP approach, used in this
paper, and Rostas’ quantity approach. In this section, I discuss both the basic methodology
behind the quantity approach and provide an in-depth discussion of the methodological sim-
ilarities and diﬀerences between both approaches. Below, I show that the quantity approach
can be rewritten to approximate a basic version of the unit value approach. I will also show,
however, that in practice the outcomes of these methods can deviate substantially. Particu-
larly the necessity to assign labor to individual commodities instead of industries within the
quantity approach, limits this methodology’s ability to estimate productivity for industries
producing a wide array of heterogeneous products. I demonstrate the basic methodology on
the basis of a simple single industry, two country, k product framework.
Rostas’ quantity approach
In the quantity approach, labor productivity (lp
ij
) for product i of country j, is defined as the
ratio between the physical quantity produced (q
ij
) and the employment used to produce this
particular commodity (emp
ij
).
lp
ij
=
q
ij
emp
ij
(13)
Unfortunately, employment at the commodity level is rarely available in historical
sources. Broadberry (1994a, 523) shows that when quantity data is not available for the whole
output of the trade, the estimate of operatives in the trade (emp
j
) can be reduced in propor-
tion to the ratio of the value of covered items (v
ij
) to the value of total gross output (go
j
), as
shown in equation (14) (Rostas 1948, 19–20).
emp
ij
= emp
j
 vij
go
j
(14)
The comparative labor productivity ratio, LP
io
, can then be obtained by dividing labor
productivity of country n by the labor productivity of country o. In equation (15), the sub-
script n represents the numerator country, whereas the subscript o represents the base coun-
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Substituting equation (14) into (13) – for both country n and o – in the comparative labor
productivity ratio above, reveals that the outcome for the quantity approach is identical to
the ratio of single deflated gross output per worker for both countries. In the case of a single
commodity, the price deflator is given by the unit value ratio for this commodity. The uvr
from equation (2) is used to transform either countries’ gross output into the other countries’
currency, making productivity in both countries directly comparable.
In the case when there are multiple clearly distinct products being produced in the same
trade, the quantity output of these products can be weighted according to their relative
prices. Broadberry (1994a, 525–6) provides an example of this procedure for the comparison
of productivity in the American and British automobile, cycle and motorcycle industries. He
shows that the heterogeneous output of this industry (i.e. automobiles, cycles and motorcy-
cles) can be converted to automobile equivalents using the relative unit values for either the
US or the UK. Equation (16) illustrates this step on the basis of country o’s relative prices
(Rostas 1948, 18–9).
Q
j(o)
=
P
p
io
 q
ij
p
1o
(16)
The outcome of equation (16) above, represents the sum of the output of k products for
country j, expressed in quantities of the base product 1 (e.g. automobiles, as in Broadberry’s
example).18 This aggregate quantity, Q
j(o)
, can in turn be used to estimate comparative labor
productivity for the entire industry; see equation (17). Note that the estimate of operatives in
the industry (emp
j
) is now reduced in proportion to the ratio of the total value of all covered
17. Note that the total production value of commodity i (v
ij
) is, by definition, equal to the physical quantity
produced (q
ij
) times the unit value (p
ij
) of this product.
18. Note that, for the calculation of the labor productivity ratios in (17) and (19), the choice of base product is
irrelevant as it cancels out in the equation.
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items (
P
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ij
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) to the value of gross output (go
j
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Rearranging the terms in equation (17) shows that the resulting productivity estimate will
still be identical to the single deflated gross output per worker, only now using the Paasche
gross output PPP (P
go
) from section 2 as deflator. If I rely on the relative prices of country n
instead, I obtain the aggregate quantity, Q
j(n)
, which in turn translates into the comparative
productivity ratio given in equation (19). This productivity estimate is still equivalent to
single deflated gross output per worker, now using the Laspeyres gross output PPP (L
go
)
from equation (3) as the price deflator.
Q
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=
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p
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Broadberry (1994a, 525) shows that, in line with the ICOP approach, the geometric av-
erage of these two estimates is taken as the overall productivity estimate in the quantity
approach – thus reflecting both the relative prices of the numerator country n as well as the
base country o. Equation (20) illustrates that this is equivalent to the Fisher deflated ratio of
gross output per worker.
LP
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The ICOP versus the quantity approach
As illustrated above, the comparative labor productivity estimates at the industry level based
on the quantity approach will be identical to those based on single deflated gross output, pro-
vided that employment at the commodity level is estimated according to equation (14). For
his 1907/09 benchmark of Anglo-American manufacturing productivity – the study against
which I contrast my own findings – Broadberry (1994a, 538–45; 1997b, 27) applies this
method throughout, making his estimates directly comparable to the single deflated pro-
ductivity ratios reported in table 10.
In section 4, I show that Broadberry’s quantity based estimates do in fact diﬀer from my
own single deflated figures, however. These diﬀerences stem primarily from the increased
coverage of this study, both with respect to the products matched as well as the number
of industries incorporated into the productivity comparison. For the manufacturing sector,
Broadberry (1994a, 538–45) directly compared 35 diﬀerent products between both countries.
In contrast, I matched a total of 111 products, considerably broadening the range of products
covered and taking important variations in the quality of goods into account.19 As noted in
section 4, this underscores one of the drawbacks of the quantity approach. The assignment of
labor used to produce a single good is economically less sensible when the share of output for
that good only comprises a small fraction of the total production value in that industry. Con-
sequently, this limits the quantity approach’s ability to estimate productivity for industries
producing a wide array of heterogeneous products (Rostas 1948, 12–4).
In addition, I base my productivity results on the total gross output (or net output) and
employment for the entire manufacturing sector. I implicitly assume that the relative price
ratios are representative conversion factors for both the industries for which products were
covered as well as those for which no matches could be made. Broadberry does not make this
assumption, and his productivity estimates are based on 29 industries covering 42 percent
of British and 37 percent of American employment. Although, both approaches have their
merits, the complete inclusion of all manufacturing industries does impact the productivity
estimates.
Furthermore, the ICOP framework allows for several extensions which serve to improve
the quality of the international benchmark estimates. The primary extension is the use of
value added and the application of the double deflation technique. As illustrated above,
the quantity approach relies on gross output as a measure of output in labor productivity,
whereas modern international comparisons generally opt for value added (Paige and Bom-
bach 1959; Maddison and van Ark 1988; van Ark 1993). This is of importance particularly
when the ratio of intermediate inputs to gross output varies between countries as well as
industries. As noted in the main text, these variations can occur as a result of diﬀerences
in production methods, the types of materials used, and the amount of imported materials,
19. See table 3 and appendix B for further details.
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but can also be caused by diﬀerences in industry classifications between the countries under
comparison (Fremdling, de Jong, and Timmer 2007a, 360). In addition, I apply the double de-
flation technique, which does not only take relative prices for gross output into account, but
also compensates for relative price diﬀerentials for intermediate inputs (Paige and Bombach
1959, 82). Double deflation is generally considered to be the preferred approach for sector
comparisons of output and productivity, and recent studies have shown that this adjustment
could be of particular importance for benchmark studies that examine the turbulent interwar
years. As governments put in place increasingly restrictive foreign trade regimes and tight
currency controls during this period, the internal price level and ratios between input and
output prices tended to deviate substantially (Fremdling, de Jong, and Timmer 2007a, 352).
Another extension to the ICOP framework is the stratified sampling approach, which in-
troduces an alternative weighting scheme. The stratified sampling theory proposes that the
process of aggregation of the relative price ratios can bemademore precise if a heterogeneous
population (the products matched) is divided into more homogeneous sub-populations, re-
ferred to as strata. These strata usually take the form of industries, the output of which can
be used as alternative weights to aggregate the price ratios. For an elaborate description of
the stratified sampling theory see the work of Timmer (1996; 2000, 21).
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B Output unit value ratios
Table 15: Output UVRs, US and UK (1909/07)
United States United Kingdom
description quantity unit quantity value quantity value uvr
(x,000) ($,000) (x,000) (£,000) ($/£)
Wheat Cubic meters 24,081 657,657 1,911 10,370 5.0
Barley Cubic meters 6,108 92,459 1,990 9,177 3.3
Oats Cubic meters 35,491 414,697 4,496 13,264 4.0
Rye Cubic meters 1,040 20,422 72 220 6.4
Beans Cubic meters 396 21,771 338 1,735 10.7
Peas Cubic meters 251 10,964 223 1,130 8.6
Buckwheat Cubic meters 523 9,331 4 22 3.1
Hay Tons (metric) 62,444 685,042 9,876 31,818 3.4
Potatoes Tons (metric) 9,709 166,424 3,981 9,892 6.9
Hops Tons (metric) 18 7,845 24 1,059 9.6
Straw Tons (metric) 507 3,280 7,112 12,660 3.6
Strawberries Tons (metric) 145 17,914 42 1,036 5.0
Raspberries Tons (metric) 35 5,132 10 309 5.0
Currants Tons (metric) 6 790 6 153 5.5
Gooseberries Tons (metric) 3 417 18 208 11.8
Other small fruit Tons (metric) 53 5,721 13 252 5.4
Apples Tons (metric) 3,181 83,231 228 1,490 4.0
Pears Tons (metric) 196 7,911 9 90 4.2
Cherries Tons (metric) 75 7,231 9 194 4.5
Plums Tons (metric) 393 10,299 36 357 2.7
Milk: farm Liters (x000) 22,007 757,562 5,492 35,274 5.4
Butter: farm Tons (metric) 451 222,861 25 2,940 4.2
Cheese: farm Tons (metric) 4 1,142 25 1,400 4.9
Eggs: farm Dozens 1,591,311 306,689 92,374 3,772 4.7
Horses Number 1,768 210,264 53 1,590 4.0
Meat: cattle and calves Tons (metric) 3,635 710,015 482 27,264 3.5
Meat: sheep Tons (metric) 287 67,073 265 18,169 3.4
Meat: pigs Tons (metric) 3,898 717,674 321 14,362 4.1
Wool: unprocessed Tons (metric) 131 65,472 40 2,600 7.7
Coal: anthracite Tons (metric) 73,536 149,416 3,972 2,297 3.5
Coal: bituminous Tons (metric) 344,498 405,487 266,864 117,256 2.7
Iron pyrite Tons (metric) 251 1,028 11 5 9.2
Petroleum Liters (x000) 28,957 128,249 179 357 2.2
Iron ore Tons (metric) 51,332 106,540 15,226 4,315 7.3
Gypsum Tons (metric) 2,044 5,907 205 98 6.0
Arsenic oxides Tons (metric) 1 53 4 41 4.8
Salt: unrefined Tons (metric) 3,825 8,344 1,264 576 4.8
Sand Tons (metric) 53,035 17,174 1,977 165 3.9
Barytes Tons (metric) 53 199 35 43 3.0
Coke Tons (metric) 35,666 89,965 11,526 9,516 3.1
Coke breeze Tons (metric) 1,489 5,723 7,706 4,434 6.7
Tar Tons (metric) 604 3,284 787 767 5.6
Cotton: yarn Tons (metric) 230 132,249 675 78,304 4.9
Cotton: piece goods Sq. meters 5,280,169 443,163 5,869,387 81,313 6.1
Cotton: waste Tons (metric) 141 10,874 195 3,749 4.0
Wool: tops Tons (metric) 5 8,027 26 4,751 8.6
Wool: noils Tons (metric) 12 8,939 8 866 6.5
Wool: waste Tons (metric) 11 3,525 13 746 5.4
Wool: shoddy and mungo Tons (metric) 22 5,699 58 1,859 8.1
Wool: yarns worsted Tons (metric) 42 83,918 72 17,524 8.2
Wool: yarns woollen Tons (metric) 18 9,649 18 2,150 4.5
Wool: flannels Sq. meters 17,219 4,390 40,530 1,774 5.8
Wool: carpets Sq. meters 47,807 48,476 21,490 3,251 6.7
continued on next page. . .
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Table 15 - continued from previous page
desc unit us_q us_v uk_q uk_v uvr
Wool: rugs Sq. meters 20,102 18,490 3,182 638 4.6
Wool: woollen tissues Sq. meters 412,078 271,013 196,733 24,403 5.3
Jute: yarns Tons (metric) 28 4,362 138 4,022 5.3
Jute: piece goods Sq. meters 59,798 4,057 218,450 3,579 4.1
Hemp: yarns Tons (metric) 2 983 7 375 7.4
Hosiery: hose, half-hose Pairs 748,688 65,121 172,668 4,402 3.4
Cordage, cables, ropes and
twine
Tons (metric) 419 76,295 106 4,701 4.1
Skins: fellmongery Number 97,681 75,648 9,831 996 7.6
Skins: tanned Number 67,572 53,119 186,344 14,688 10.0
Gloves: leather Dozen Pairs 40,424 22,526 7,020 839 4.7
Boots and shoes: leather Pairs 247,643 442,631 97,984 20,066 8.7
Hats: felt Number 40,267 46,146 18,888 2,491 8.7
Shawls Number 2,627 916 1,219 238 1.8
Pig iron Tons (metric) 26,063 387,830 10,276 33,304 4.6
Steel: ingots Tons (metric) 129 3,594 6,627 29,740 6.2
Iron and steel: bars, rods
and structural shapes
Tons (metric) 5,533 192,642 3,283 24,246 4.7
Iron and steel: rails Tons (metric) 2,690 77,811 970 5,638 5.0
Iron and steel: plates and
sheets
Tons (metric) 3,023 133,272 1,639 11,977 6.0
Iron and steel: armor plates Tons (metric) 24 10,649 18 1,771 4.5
Iron and steel: hoops and
strips
Tons (metric) 309 10,430 396 3,045 4.4
Iron and steel: pipes and
fittings, cast
Tons (metric) 1,891 64,515 347 2,013 5.9
Iron and steel: tires and
axles
Tons (metric) 93 3,831 139 1,910 3.0
Iron and steel: scrap metal Tons (metric) 1,124 18,164 710 2,231 5.1
Iron and steel: blooms,
billets and slabs
Tons (metric) 4,511 110,762 609 3,376 4.4
Steel: sheets and tinplate
bars
Tons (metric) 1,499 37,745 1,007 5,308 4.8
Tinplate: tinplate and
terneplate
Tons (metric) 597 45,815 537 7,402 5.6
Tinplate: black plates and
sheets
Tons (metric) 573 30,956 145 1,343 5.8
Iron and steel: pipes and
fittings, wrought
Tons (metric) 1,578 90,622 309 6,090 2.9
Iron and steel: wire rods Tons (metric) 2,082 61,948 119 882 4.0
Iron and steel: wire Tons (metric) 1,043 52,727 189 2,801 3.4
Iron and steel: nails Tons (metric) 46 2,218 16 176 4.3
Iron and steel: wire nails
and staples
Tons (metric) 657 28,900 5 55 3.7
Iron and steel: galvanized
sheets
Tons (metric) 392 25,912 505 7,157 4.7
Bicycles Number 168 2,388 624 3,441 2.6
Motor cycles Number 19 3,016 4 139 4.4
Motor cars Number 127 164,308 10 3,323 3.8
Vessels: wood and steel Tonnage (gross) 467 37,680 1,614 24,178 5.4
Copper: ingots Tons (metric) 496 142,084 42 3,422 3.5
Copper: plates, sheets, rods Tons (metric) 138 40,916 51 4,881 3.1
Copper: wire Tons (metric) 140 47,184 13 1,350 3.2
Brass: wire Tons (metric) 16 5,580 3 218 4.2
Lead: pig Tons (metric) 321 30,460 29 518 5.4
Tin: pig Tons (metric) 0 16 13 2,177 4.0
Flour: wheat Tons (metric) 10,497 557,815 4,037 43,139 5.0
Oﬀals: wheat Tons (metric) 3,788 91,407 1,959 8,694 5.4
continued on next page. . .
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Table 15 - continued from previous page
desc unit us_q us_v uk_q uk_v uvr
Flour: barley, corn,
buckwheat
Tons (metric) 2,972 117,213 1,459 11,100 5.2
Animal feed Tons (metric) 5,444 164,735 150 1,006 4.5
Rice: cleaned Tons (metric) 298 21,048 92 895 7.3
Pork: bacon Tons (metric) 336 97,856 87 5,326 4.7
Pork: hams Tons (metric) 358 101,089 23 1,663 3.9
Pork: salted Tons (metric) 432 95,959 1 35 6.1
Lard Tons (metric) 564 134,397 31 1,479 5.0
Butter: factory Tons (metric) 186 115,098 56 5,840 5.9
Cheese: factory Tons (metric) 139 42,435 4 193 6.0
Cream: factory Tons (metric) 37 9,829 5 398 3.4
Margarine: factory Tons (metric) 19 5,964 45 2,094 6.5
Ice Tons (metric) 12,909 44,139 619 389 5.4
Sugar: refined Tons (metric) 747 71,741 574 8,995 6.1
Molasses Tons (metric) 249 3,975 56 303 3.0
Fish: cured Tons (metric) 0 10 133 3,712 4.7
Cigars Tons (metric) 64 193,807 2 1,146 4.5
Cigarettes Tons (metric) 14 35,373 14 4,532 7.7
Manufactured tobacco Tons (metric) 159 131,660 34 4,478 6.3
Acid: acetic Tons (metric) 26 1,337 6 91 3.5
Acid: nitric Tons (metric) 12 1,357 6 91 7.3
Acid: sulphuric Tons (metric) 1,340 10,085 550 955 4.3
Sulphates: alum Tons (metric) 33 654 73 213 6.7
Sulphates: ammonia Tons (metric) 56 3,227 306 3,271 5.4
Bleaching materials Tons (metric) 14 226 111 444 3.9
Borax Tons (metric) 38 1,202 14 205 2.2
Essential oils Tons (metric) 0 1,129 0 112 7.6
Soda compounds Tons (metric) 842 17,270 693 3,317 4.3
Sulphur Tons (metric) 260 4,605 31 148 3.8
Tallow and animal fat Tons (metric) 117 20,372 56 1,459 6.7
Fertilizer: superphosphate Tons (metric) 1,375 16,957 615 1,321 5.7
Fertilizer: other Tons (metric) 3,379 75,413 520 2,353 4.9
Glue and gelatine Tons (metric) 13 1,944 43 653 10.2
Soap: hard Tons (metric) 802 89,830 302 7,266 4.7
Soap: soft Tons (metric) 27 1,269 83 1,499 2.6
Glycerin Tons (metric) 53 16,591 16 604 8.4
Paraﬃn wax Tons (metric) 161 9,389 4 99 2.1
Seedcrushing Tons (metric) 1,652 91,100 1,393 12,940 5.9
Hard wood: oak Cubic meters 10,417 90,512 102 237 3.7
Hard wood: ash Cubic meters 687 7,116 17 37 4.7
Hard wood: elm Cubic meters 820 6,088 17 21 5.8
Paper: fine Tons (metric) 172 29,079 120 3,059 6.7
Paper: printing Tons (metric) 1,589 89,702 462 5,894 4.4
Paper: packing and
wrapping
Tons (metric) 692 42,221 191 2,032 5.7
Paper: printed and coated Tons (metric) 102 11,397 39 975 4.5
Paper: boards Tons (metric) 801 29,498 54 626 3.2
Paper: other Tons (metric) 15 1,736 14 440 3.9
Bricks Thousands 12,473 94,993 4,760 6,329 5.7
Cement Tons (metric) 13,407 68,752 2,923 3,439 4.4
Organs, reed Number 64 2,595 4 30 5.8
Pianos Number 331 46,188 58 972 8.3
Pianolas Number 45 10,750 1 23 5.1
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